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WELFARE PAYMENTS AND CRIME
C. Fritz Foley*
Abstract—Analysis of daily reported incidents of major crimes in twelve
U.S. cities reveals an increase in crime over the course of monthly welfare
payment cycles. This increase reflects an increase in crimes that are likely
to have a direct financial motivation as opposed to other kinds of crime.
Temporal patterns in crime are observed in jurisdictions in which disbur-
sements are focused at the beginning of monthly welfare payment cycles
and not in jurisdictions in which disbursements are relatively more stag-
gered. These findings indicate that welfare beneficiaries consume welfare-
related income quickly and then attempt to supplement it with criminal
income.
I. Introduction
CONSIDER an individual who receives support frommonthly welfare payments that are distributed at the
beginning of the month. These payments may be made
directly to this individual or to someone who provides for
the individual or transacts with the individual. Welfare pay-
ments are disbursed on a monthly basis, and a series of stu-
dies indicate that the typical recipient of cash assistance
increases consumption immediately following the receipt of
payments and exhausts these payments quickly. Poor indi-
viduals are also unlikely to have access to savings or credit
that might help cover temporary cash shortfalls and often
have weak earnings prospects in legitimate economic activ-
ity. Consequently, this hypothetical individual might deplete
welfare-related income quickly and turn to crime to supple-
ment this income. This paper tests if income-generating
criminal activity is increasing in the amount of time that has
passed since welfare payments occurred.
The analysis exploits plausibly exogenous variation in
the timing of payments across cities and differences in the
likely motivation of different kinds of crime. The three wel-
fare programs that provide the largest share of income
maintenance benefits to the poor are considered: the Food
Stamp Program, the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) Program, and the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) Program. The sample of reported incidents of
crime covers twelve cities in which more than 10% of the
population receives payments from the most inclusive wel-
fare program, the Food Stamp Program. If patterns in crime
are influenced by the timing of welfare payments, then
increases in crime over the course of monthly payment
cycles should be most pronounced in cities in which such
payments are focused at the beginning of these cycles. If
criminal income is used to supplement welfare income, then
any increase in crime should be reflected in Type I Uniform
Crime Report (UCR) or Group A National Incident Based
Reporting System (NIBRS) crimes with a direct financial
motivation (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and
robbery) and not other Type I UCR or Group A NIBRS
crimes (arson, assault offenses, forcible sex offenses, and
homicide).
Two approaches yield results indicating that crime rates
in fact increase in the amount of time that has passed since
welfare payments occurred. The first approach tests if levels
of criminal activity are different in the first ten calendar
days of the month; this time frame corresponds to the per-
iod over which food stamp payments occur in cities where
they are focused at the beginning of the month. Rates of
crime and counts of reported incidents are higher after the
first ten days of the month in jurisdictions where welfare
payments are focused at the beginning of the month but not
in other jurisdictions. The second approach employs an
index that reflects the number of days since welfare pay-
ments occurred in a city. This index takes into account pay-
ments related to not only food stamps but also TANF and
SSI. Higher values of the index are associated with more
crime.
Both approaches also reveal that increases in crime over
the course of monthly welfare payment cycles are observed
only for crimes that are likely to have a financial motivation
and not for other Type I UCR or Group A NIBRS crimes.
These findings are inconsistent with explanations for tem-
poral patterns in crime that are unrelated to the timing
of welfare payments, like explanations related to police
officer deployment or incentives to report crimes as having
occurred at certain times.
The findings in this paper make a number of contribu-
tions. First, they indicate a role for behavioral considera-
tions in economic explanations of criminal activity. Becker
(1968) provides a framework for analyzing criminal beha-
vior in which criminals rationally weigh the costs and bene-
fits of illegal activity and are more likely to turn to crime
when they are likely to earn less from legitimate activities.
This framework has received ample empirical support.1
Recent work showing that cash assistance recipients typi-
cally spend their payments too quickly implies a channel by
which a particular behavioral bias, short-run impatience,
affects the decision to engage in criminal activity. Shapiro
(2005) documents that food stamp recipients experience aReceived for publication November 24, 2008. Revision accepted for
publication October 14, 2009.
* Harvard Business School and NBER.
I thank Jeff Cronin, Linnea Meyer, and Janelle Prevost for excellent
research assistance and police departments in twelve cities for providing
data. Seminar participants at the American Law and Economics Associa-
tion Annual Meeting, Harvard University, the NBER Law and Economics
Program Meeting, Wesleyan University, Yale Law School, an anonymous
referee, and numerous others provided very helpful comments. The Divi-
sion of Research at Harvard Business School provided generous funding.
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decline in caloric intake and an increase in the marginal uti-
lity of consumption in between food stamp payments. Ste-
phens (2003) finds that households that depend primarily on
social security for income increase spending on goods that
reflect instantaneous consumption in the first few days fol-
lowing the receipt of their check. Stephens and Unayama
(2008) show that more frequent retirement payments
smooth consumption among retired Japanese pension
recipients. Dobkin and Puller (2007) find that welfare reci-
pients increase their consumption of illegal drugs when
their checks arrive at the beginning of the month, spurring
an increase in hospitalizations and deaths. These studies
provide evidence of short-run impatience and violations of
the permanent income hypothesis.2 My results indicate that
this type of consumption behavior is associated with an
increase in financially motivated criminal activity later in
monthly welfare payment cycles. These types of behavioral
effects call for distinctive public policy responses, as noted
by Jolls (2007) and Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir
(2004).
Second, the paper illustrates an effect of the design of
welfare programs on crime. A large literature, parts of
which are reviewed in Moffitt (1992) and Blank (2002),
considers the effects of welfare programs on employment,
poverty, family structure, and other factors. Some studies
analyze the effects of welfare payments on criminal activity
using cross-sectional data. DeFranzo (1996, 1997) and Han-
non and DeFranzo (1998a, 1998b) present evidence that
welfare payments reduce major crimes. However, Burek
(2005) finds that welfare payments are associated with
higher levels of less severe crimes. These studies typically
face challenges controlling for all the characteristics of jur-
isdictions that are likely to affect both the use of welfare
programs and criminal activity.
The findings in my paper point out that the timing and fre-
quency of welfare payments have effects that carry policy
implications. Staggered, frequent payments would smooth
levels of crime. The leveling of criminal activity would
make communities safer because police departments would
not become overwhelmed by cyclical spikes. If, as shown in
previous work, welfare beneficiaries exhibit short-run impa-
tience and follow a quasi-hyperbolic model of intertemporal
choice, more frequent payments would reduce the extent to
which they overconsume soon after payments arrive. Bene-
ficiaries would be less likely to experience increased mar-
ginal utility of consumption and dire circumstances at the
end of monthly payment cycles. As a consequence, they
would not have such strong incentives to turn to crime to
augment their income, and crime rates could be lower.
This paper also adds to the burgeoning literature on
household finance. Campbell (2006) explores this field.
Only a small part of the work in this field specifically consid-
ers the personal finances of low-income individuals. Duflo
et al. (2006) and Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano (2006)
argue that low-income individuals in particular do not save
enough. Low savings levels can have detrimental conse-
quences for the poor, who face severe credit constraints,
as documented in Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009), Barr
(2004), and elsewhere. My analysis indicates that individuals
who exhaust their legitimate income rapidly and do not have
access to savings or credit attempt to increase their income
through criminal activity.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section explains the hypotheses in more detail, and
section III describes the data and the main tests. Section IV
presents the results, and the last section concludes.
II. Hypotheses
Welfare payments are distributed on a monthly basis
according to payment schedules that vary across programs
and states. In many jurisdictions, payments from all the
major programs to all recipients occur during a short period
within each month, typically the beginning of the month.
Studies of the consumption of cash assistance recipients,
including Shapiro (2005), Stephens (2003), and Stephens
and Unayama (2008), reveal that recipients of infrequent
payments do not smooth their consumption but instead
exhibit short-run impatience. These recipients typically do
not have access to savings or credit.
Shapiro (2005) shows that the consumption behavior of
food stamp recipients is consistent with their following a
quasi-hyperbolic model, not an exponential model, of inter-
temporal choice. In the data he analyzes and uses to cali-
brate this model, levels of caloric intake fall, and the mar-
ginal utility of consumption appears to increase over the
course of monthly welfare payment cycles. Recipients
report missing meals because they have exhausted their
food stamp payments. In the quasi-hyperbolic model, reci-
pients would be better off and less likely to face dire cir-
cumstances at the end of the month if they were somehow
forced to smooth their consumption.
Short-run impatience generates circumstances that are
likely to cause crime rates to increase as time passes in
monthly welfare payment cycles. In jurisdictions where all
welfare payments occur at the beginning of the month, indi-
viduals who are welfare recipients or who transact with or
receive support from a recipient are likely to have sufficient
resources at the start of the month for their consumption
needs and for engaging in activities that incapacitate them
2 Phelps and Pollak (1968) develop a simple framework of short-run
impatience, and this framework is employed by Laibson (1997),
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001), and Angeletos et al. (2001) to con-
sider a variety of economic applications. A number of papers provide evi-
dence on the validity of the permanent income hypothesis by studying the
immediate consumption response to changes in income. Recent work
includes Shapiro and Slemrod (2003), Hsieh (2003), Johnson, Parker, and
Souleles (2006), and Stephens (2008). Lee and McCrary (2005) present
evidence that criminals typically have high discount rates or hyperbolic
time preferences.
3 Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006) show that weak credit conditions
increase crime more generally.
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from committing crimes. However, such individuals may
not have sufficient resources later in the monthly payment
cycle and may turn to crime to augment their welfare-
related income. Frameworks that account for short-run
impatience, like the one developed in O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999), imply that such individuals will delay crim-
inal activity even if they anticipate a cash shortfall at the
time of the payment and plan to make up this shortfall with
criminal income. This is because criminal activity has
immediate costs; it requires effort and potentially results in
punishment.
Self-control problems would not affect patterns in con-
sumption or crime if people learned to control them, but
there is little evidence that this is the case. DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2006) find that gym members frequently
renew monthly contracts even though they would pay less
per visit if they paid on a daily basis. Choi, Laibson, and
Madrian (2005) find positive but small effects of financial
education on savings decisions. Self-control problems seem
to persist.
Although previous work finds compelling evidence of
short-run impatience among welfare recipients, it is note-
worthy that even an individual who receives support from
welfare payments and does not exhibit short-run impatience
may be more likely to engage in criminal activity later dur-
ing monthly welfare payment cycles. He may have very
low income, a high marginal utility of consumption, and no
savings or access to credit and face uncertainty about the
extent to which he will face a cash shortfall. He may, for
example, face unexpected shocks to the prices of the goods
he consumes. Given this uncertainty, he would be likely to
delay criminal activity until it is necessary.
These considerations imply predictions for temporal pat-
terns in crime in different kinds of cities. In cities where
payments from welfare programs are focused at the begin-
ning of the month, criminal activity should increase as the
time since payments occurred increases. Increased criminal
activity should reflect increases in types of crime that have
a financial motivation, not other kinds of crime. In cities
where welfare programs make payments to different recipi-
ents on different days over longer time periods or where
payments to individuals occur more frequently than once a
month, there should not be any significant monthly tem-
poral pattern in crime.
This discussion has stressed the effect of the timing of
welfare payments on the demand for criminal income. It is
worth considering briefly the potential effects of the timing
of payments on the supply of victims. If all welfare pay-
ments occurred at a particular point in time during the
month, this might increase the pool of potential victims and
the attractiveness and ease of stealing property. Crime rates
could then be higher immediately following payments.
However, most welfare payments are distributed onto elec-
tronic benefit transfer cards, and the funds on these cards
are difficult to steal because recipients must present a valid
identification card to use them. Therefore, the timing of dis-
bursement is unlikely to have a large effect on the supply of
potential victims.
Potential victims of crime might respond to changes in
the demand for criminal income by taking avoidance mea-
sures. For example, potential victims of burglary or robbery
could remain ensconced in their locked homes during peri-
ods when such crimes are expected to be more common.
However, most avoidance activities are costly, so any
response by potential victims to changes in the demand for
criminal income is likely to be incomplete.
III. Data and Tests
The basic empirical approach is to study differences in
criminal activity over the course of monthly welfare pay-
ment cycles in cities across which there is variation in the
timing of payments. This analysis requires information on
welfare payments by jurisdiction and detailed crime data.
A. Data on Welfare Programs
The three primary welfare programs that provide income
maintenance benefits are the Food Stamp Program, the
TANF Program, and the SSI Program.4 Each of these pro-
grams provides assistance to poor households that meet
income and resource requirements. The Food Stamp Pro-
gram provides funds that can be used at most grocery
stores, and the TANF Program provides income mainte-
nance payments to needy families. In most states, both pro-
grams distribute payments electronically through electronic
benefit transfer debit cards, and payments that are not spent
in a particular month are carried forward to the next month.
SSI pays benefits to adults and children who have limited
means and are physically or mentally disabled. These pay-
ments are made once a month by check or direct deposit,
with each means of distribution comprising half of the total.
The Food Stamp Program has the broadest coverage in the
sense that TANF and SSI recipients typically meet the elig-
ibility requirements to receive food stamps. Because of its
extensive coverage, I select a sample of cities on the basis
of participation in the Food Stamp Program.
Quantifiable effects of the timing of welfare payments on
crime are more likely to be observed in jurisdictions where a
substantial share of the population receives such payments.
Fellowes and Berube (2005) compute Food Stamp Program
participation rates in major metropolitan areas and counties.
On the basis of their study, I select jurisdictions in which at
least 10% of the population participates in the Food Stamp Pro-
gram. This screen yields a sample of fifteen cities: Baltimore,
Maryland; Detroit, Michigan; El Paso, Texas; Fresno, Califor-
nia; McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, Texas; Memphis, Tennessee;
4 There are other smaller programs that provide income maintenance
payments to the poor. For example, general assistance programs exist in
some jurisdictions in the United States of America but these are not feder-
ally funded and at the national level comprise less than 5% of the pay-
ments made by the three programs that are considered in my analysis.
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Miami, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; New Orleans, Louisi-
ana; NewYork, NewYork; Newark, New Jersey; Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Providence, Rhode Island; St. Louis, Missouri;
and Washington, DC. Data on reported incidents of crime
are not available for Memphis, New York, and McAllen-
Edinburg-Mission, so the final sample contains twelve cities.
Panels A and B of table 1 provide information on the use
of the three main welfare programs in each city in the sam-
ple. For comparability with the data on the Food Stamp Pro-
gram, drawn from Fellowes and Berube (2005), the data on
TANF and SSI Programs cover the year 1999.5 On average
across cities, the Food Stamp Program serves about twice
as many people as TANF programs and more than three
times as many people as SSI. The value of TANF Program
TABLE 1.—WELFARE PROGRAM DETAILS BY CITY
A: Population and Share of Population Receiving Welfare Payments
City Population Food Stamps TANF SSI
Early payment sample
Detroit, Michigan 2,061,162 12.2% 6.3% 3.7%
Fresno, California 799,407 10.2% 7.3% 4.5%
Newark, New Jersey 793,633 11.5% 5.1% 3.2%
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 1,517,550 17.9% 9.3% 5.4%
Providence, Rhode Island 621,602 10.0% 6.6% 3.4%
Washington, DC 572,059 14.3% 8.5% 3.5%
Staggered payment sample
Baltimore, Maryland 651,154 15.3% 7.5% 5.1%
El Paso, Texas 679,622 16.7% 2.6% 3.1%
Miami, Florida 2,253,362 11.3% 2.7% 4.8%
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 940,164 10.6% 3.2% 3.4%
New Orleans, Louisiana 1,381,652 12.0% 1.7% 2.0%
St. Louis, Missouri 348,189 22.4% 5.6% 5.3%
B: Value of Welfare Payments
City Food Stamps TANF SSI
Early payment sample
Detroit, Michigan 214,368 407,981 394,728
Fresno, California 81,530 183,609 206,600
Newark, New Jersey 92,768 94,436 124,160
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 264,965 288,589 436,889
Providence, Rhode Island 43,410 108,703 99,618
Washington, District of Columbia 81,061 100,401 91,231
Staggered payment sample
Baltimore, Maryland 103,252 139,554 162,470
El Paso, Texas 100,659 30,488 75,551
Miami, Florida 208,965 143,462 502,810
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 71,092 165,946 204,177
New Orleans, Louisiana 161,504 27,150 89,401
St. Louis, Missouri 70,183 67,542 89,401
C: Delivery Dates of Welfare Payments
City Food Stamps TANF SSI
Early payment sample
Detroit, Michigan 1st–9th Twice a month, staggered 1st
Fresno, California 1st–10th 1st 1st
Newark, New Jersey 1st–5th 1st 1st
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 1st–10th Twice a month, staggered 1st
Providence, Rhode Island 1st 1st and 16th 1st
Washington, District of Columbia 1st–10th 1st 1st
Staggered payment sample
Baltimore, Maryland 6th–15th 1st–15th 1st
El Paso, Texas 1st–15th 1st–15th 1st
Miami, Florida 1st–15th 1st–15th 1st
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 2nd–15th 1st 1st
New Orleans, Louisiana 5th–14th 1st–5th 1st
St. Louis, Missouri 1st–22nd 1st–4th 1st
This table provides details about welfare programs in the twelve cities in the sample. Panel A lists city populations and the percent of the population receiving food stamps, TANF payments, and SSI payments.
Panel B provides data on the value of payments in thousands of dollars for each of these programs, and panel C lists the dates in the month on which these payments are distributed. Population data and data on the
number of recipients and the value of payments are all for the year 1999, except that the number of SSI recipients in Miami and El Paso are for the year 1995. Data from Detroit cover Wayne County; Fresno, Fresno
County; Newark, Essex County; Philadelphia, Philadelphia County; Providence, Providence County; Washington, District of Columbia County; Baltimore, Baltimore City County; El Paso, El Paso MSA; Miami,
Miami MSA; Milwaukee, Milwaukee County; New Orleans, Orleans Parish; and St. Louis, St. Louis County.
5 Data on the value of family assistance and SSI Program payments are
taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Local Area Personal Income
Database. Numbers of family assistance recipients are obtained from the
offices of state TANF directors. Data on the number of SSI recipients for
counties are from SSI Recipients by State and County, and for MSAs they
are drawn from the State and Metropolitan Area Databook 1997–1998.
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payments and SSI Program payments often exceeds the
value of food stamp payments, implying higher payments
per recipient. However, relative to TANF and SSI, food
stamps became a more significant source of income over
the 1999–2005 period. Foley (2008) reports that, averaged
across cities, the compound annual growth rate in the value
of food stamps over this period is 8.2%, while the rates for
TANF and SSI are 0.7% and 2.3%, respectively.
Panel C of table 1 provides information about the timing
of payments for each program in each city. Payment sche-
dules are set at the state and federal levels, not the city
level, and they have not changed substantially over the past
decade. In most jurisdictions, each of the three programs
makes payments to recipients once a month.6 In some juris-
dictions, food stamp and TANF payments occur during cer-
tain time periods. For example, in Fresno, food stamps are
paid over the first ten days of the month, with the date of
distribution depending on the last digit of the recipient’s
case number. TANF payments occur twice per month in
three of the cities in the sample.
Interviews with welfare program managers suggest sev-
eral common considerations were important in setting pay-
ment schedules.7 Legal requirements, historical precedent,
and budget processes played a role in decisions to make a
single monthly payment early in the month. Federal law
requires that food stamp payments and SSI payments occur
in monthly allotments. Historically, payments occurred by
mail in the form of a check. This method entailed delivery
costs that were not insignificant, creating an incentive to
make TANF payments only once a month as well. Man-
agers of many programs seem to have somewhat arbitrarily
decided to provide recipients with payments for each calen-
dar month at the beginning of the month. Some managers
explain that such a payment schedule was simply carried
over when methods of payment changed. The timing of
payments to recipients was also often set to follow monthly
budget and funding practices. Welfare program budgets are
often set on a monthly basis. Some managers asserted that
the most straightforward way of matching expenses to fund-
ing levels is to make payments intended to cover the next
month once a month at the beginning of the month.
Managers of programs that make payments twice a
month or stagger payments across recipients say that such
schedules were selected because of a desire to help recipi-
ents manage their money, requests from retailers, and con-
siderations related to information technology systems and
program support services. Bimonthly payments were in part
designed to help recipients manage their resources. In some
cases, retailers, especially grocers, asked that payments be
staggered across a set of delivery dates in order to reduce
monthly fluctuations in demand. These motivations for
smoothing payouts indicate that some program managers
are aware of the consumption behavior of welfare recipients
documented in the literature. Managers also stagger pay-
ments in some cases in order to facilitate the administration
of certain aspects of their programs. They can better
respond to recipient queries if payments are staggered
because payments trigger queries, and these are easier to
handle if they do not all occur around the same time. Some
information technology systems can also process claims
more efficiently if these claims are not all handled at once.
Thus, welfare payment schedules do not seem to have
been set in a way that might misconstrue the impact of con-
sumption patterns and liquidity constraints on crime. None
of the program managers interviewed cited scheduling
motivations that would correlate with crime other than con-
cerns about how recipient manage their money.
B. Data on Criminal Activity
Conducting tests on the effects of the timing of welfare
payments on crime across jurisdictions also requires detailed
data on reported incidents of crime. Unfortunately, compre-
hensive incident data for the cities with large welfare popula-
tions are not available in NIBRS; NIBRS covers only juris-
dictions that have agreed to provide data, and very few large
cities have done so. Therefore, obtaining these data required
directly contacting police departments. In order to ensure the
comparability of data across jurisdictions, I attempted to
obtain data covering the 2004–2006 period on each incident
classified as a Part I UCR offense or a Group A NIBRS
offense. These categories of crime are arson, assault offenses,
burglary, forcible sex offenses, homicide, larceny-theft, motor
vehicle theft, and robbery. I requested information about the
type, date, time, and the location of each incident.
Twelve of the fifteen jurisdictions identified above pro-
vided usable data.8 Table 2 identifies the crime data
obtained from each city in the sample. All of the cities
except Detroit used the UCR reporting system. Although I
attempted to obtain complete data covering the 2004–2006
period from each jurisdiction, detailed data from some
cities are available for only portions of this time frame, as
indicated in table 2.9
6 Cole and Lee (2005) identify the dates on which food stamp disburse-
ments occur. I confirmed these dates and obtained data on the timing of
TANF payments from the divisions of state and local governments that
oversee this program. The Social Security Administration provided infor-
mation on the timing of SSI payments.
7 Information on how payment schedules were set was gathered by
interviewing approximately fifteen program managers. For many pro-
grams in many jurisdictions, decisions regarding payment schedules are
long-standing, and there is no documentation on how decisions were
made. Therefore it is difficult to pinpoint rationales, but the interviews
suggest several common considerations were important.
8 The three cities that did not provide data are Memphis, New York,
and the McAllen-Edinburg-Mission MSA. Police officers in Memphis
and New York denied my requests for data and rejected my appeals of
their denials. McAllen-Edinburg-Mission is not a single city but a collec-
tion of three cities, so I excluded it.
9 In several jurisdictions, changes to computer systems prevented
departments from providing me with data for the full sample period. Cer-
tain kinds of crime are also not included in the data for some cities. For
example, arson is not covered in the sample for six cities. In some juris-
dictions, this type of crime is collected and aggregated by the fire depart-
ment and not the police department.
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C. The Tests
The empirical tests consider two measures of crime:
crime rates and counts of reported incidents of crime. Crime
rates are computed by taking the number of reported inci-
dents of crime on a particular day in a particular city and
dividing that number by the sample period average number
of daily reported incidents in the city.10 OLS specifications
are used to analyze crime rates, and negative binomial spe-
cifications are used to analyze counts of reported incidents.
Variation in the timing of payments allows me to conduct
two kinds of tests. The first is transparent but somewhat
crude. It distinguishes between cities in which food stamp
payments are distributed in the first ten days of the month
and those in which payments are more staggered. Food
stamp payments occur early in the month in Detroit, Fresno,
Newark, Philadelphia, Providence, and Washington, and I
refer to this sample as the early payment sample. Food
stamp payments are more staggered in the month in Balti-
more, El Paso, Miami, Milwaukee, New Orleans, and St.
Louis, and I refer to this sample as the staggered payment
sample. Tests explaining levels of crime include a dummy
that is equal to 1 in the first ten days of the month and other-
wise equal to 0, as well as an interaction between this
dummy and a dummy that is equal to 1 for the staggered
payment sample and 0 for the early payment sample. The
coefficient on the time-specific dummy reveals if criminal
activity is lower in the early part of the month in cities
where welfare payments are focused at the start of the
month, and the coefficient on this variable interacted with
the staggered payment dummy reveals if temporal patterns
in crime are different in cities where payments are more
staggered.
Information on the magnitude and timing of TANF pay-
ments and SSI payments raises a concern about distinguish-
ing among cities on the basis of the timing of food stamp
payments alone. As indicated in panel C of table 1, SSI pay-
ments occur on the first of the month in all jurisdictions.
TANF programs make payments twice a month in Detroit,
Philadelphia, and Providence, which are all in the early
payment sample, and these payments are made on the first
of the month in Milwaukee, classified as part of the stag-
gered payment sample. In robustness checks, I remove
observations from Detroit, Philadelphia, Providence, and
Milwaukee from the data, leaving a set of cities for which
the classification based on the timing of food stamp pay-
ments is less subject to concern.
The second type of test employs an index that reflects the
number of days that have passed since recipients received
their last welfare payment in a particular city. It is com-
puted using the information on the number of welfare reci-
pients and the dates of payments. All three of the major
welfare programs are taken into account. For programs that
make payments over a period of days within a month, I
assume that an equal number of recipients receive payments
on each of the days within the period. For each program on
each calendar day, I compute the average number of days
that have passed since recipients received their last pay-
ment. For example, if food stamp payments occur on the
first and second days of the month, on the fourth day of the
month this average is two and a half days. I then take a
weighted average of these program-specific measures where
weights are set equal to the number of total recipients in
each program.11 The weighted average is divided by 30 to
create an index that takes on values between 0 and 1. In the
extreme case that all welfare recipients received a payment
from each program on the first of the month, the index
would be 0 on that day, and if no additional payments
occurred over the course of the month, the index would be
equal to 1 on the last day of months with 31 days.
To provide further intuition for this index, figure 1 dis-
plays values of the index by the day of the month for Provi-
dence and St. Louis. In Providence, food stamp and SSI
payments occur only once a month on the first of the month,
TABLE 2.—CRIME DATA COVERAGE FOR CITIES IN THE SAMPLE
City Type of Crimes Covered Sample Period
Detroit, Michigan All Group A NIBRS crimes 2005–2006
Fresno, California All Part I UCR crimes 2004–2006
Newark, New Jersey All Part I UCR crimes except rape and arson 2005–2006
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania All Part I UCR crimes except arson 2004–2006
Providence, Rhode Island All Part I UCR crimes except arson 2004–2006
Washington, DC All Part I UCR crimes Aug. 1, 2004–Sept. 30, 2005; 2006
Baltimore, Maryland All Part I UCR crimes except arson and homicide 2006
Milwaukee, Wisconsin All Part I UCR crimes 2005–2006
St. Louis, Missouri All Part I UCR crimes 2004–2006
Miami, Florida All Part I UCR crimes 2004, Aug. 1, 2005–Dec. 31, 2006
New Orleans, Louisiana All Part I UCR crimes except arson, homicide, and rape 2006
El Paso, Texas Robbery, burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft July 7, 2005–Dec. 31, 2006
10 Jacob et al. (2007) use a similar approach to measure weekly crime
rates.
11 Similar indices and results are obtained if the values of program pay-
ments are used as weights.
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and TANF payments occur twice a month, on the first and
the sixteenth. Therefore, the index for Providence is 0 on
the first of the month. It increases over the course of the
month and drops down on the sixteenth to reflect the fact
that TANF recipients receive a payment at that time. In
St. Louis, SSI payments occur on the first of the month, but
food stamp payments are distributed over the first 22 days
of the month, and TANF payments are distributed over the
first 4 days of the month, with different recipients receiving
payment on different days. As a consequence, there is less
variation in the index for St. Louis than there is for Provi-
dence, and it is fairly level over the first 22 days of the
month before increasing. One benefit of using this index in
specifications that identify patterns in criminal activity is
that it allows the use of fixed effects for each calendar day
of the month.
By identifying the effects of the timing of welfare pro-
gram payments off of differences in payment schedules
across cities, the tests rule out explanations for temporal
patterns in crime that are unrelated to welfare payments but
are related to factors that are likely to be operative in all the
cities in the sample. For example, rents are typically due at
the start of the month, and these payments could induce
criminal activity at the end of the month. Paychecks from
legitimate employment are also often issued once or twice a
month. Differences in temporal patterns of crime across
cities where the timing of welfare payments differs are not
consistent with alternative explanations for an increase in
crime throughout the month based on these kinds of consid-
erations.
The tests are performed for different types of crime. The
main hypothesis makes predictions about the timing of
crimes in which perpetrators are likely to have a direct
financial motivation. I refer to burglary, larceny-theft,
motor vehicle theft, and robbery as financially motivated
crimes. I refer to other Type I or Group A crimes as other
crimes, and they include arson, assault offenses, forcible
sex offenses, and homicide.12
Some factors would give rise to the same temporal pat-
terns for both types of crime. Police officers may have an
incentive to document incidents as occurring at a particular
time, perhaps the beginning or end of the month. If the
deployment of law enforcement resources varies through
the month, criminals of all types might time their activity
so as to minimize the chances of arrest. Criminals might
also benefit from conspiring to commit more of all types of
crimes at a particular point in time because limited enforce-
ment resources could be more easily evaded. Under each of
these scenarios, financially motivated crimes and other
types of crime would exhibit similar temporal patterns.
However, if patterns in crime reflect the timing of welfare
payments, then only financially motivated crimes should
become more prevalent over the course of welfare payment
cycles in jurisdictions where payments are focused at the
beginning of these cycles.
In keeping with the analysis of patterns in crime pre-
sented in papers like Jacob, Lefgren, and Morretti (2007)
and Jacob and Lefgren (2003), the analysis here controls for
the effects of weather and holidays on crime. Daily data on
the average temperature in degrees Fahrenheit, inches of
precipitation, and inches of snowfall are obtained from
the National Climatic Data Center.13 Days that are U.S. fed-
eral holidays are identified as holidays. Table 3 provides
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
The nature of the data and tests raises two issues regard-
ing the calculation of standard errors in regression analysis.
First, there could be serial correlation across observations
for a city over the course of each month. In order to address
this possibility, the tables present standard errors that are
computed using a block bootstrap technique in which city-
month blocks are used for resampling. Second, it is also
conceivable that observed patterns in crime within a city
are similar over the course of the month for different
months. To consider the potential impact of this issue, unre-
ported analysis collapses the data to the city level and com-
pares average crime rates in the first ten days of the month
and the remainder of the month across cities in the early
payment sample and the staggered payment sample. The
results of this analysis and the statistical significance of
FIGURE 1.—THE VALUES OF THE TIME-SINCE-PAYMENT INDEX FOR
PROVIDENCE AND ST. LOUIS
The time-since-payment index is an index between 0 and 1 that reflects the average number of days
that have passed since welfare recipients received their last payment. It accounts for payments related to
food stamps, TANF, and SSI. If a program makes payments over a range of dates, it is assumed that an
equal number of recipients receives payment on each day in the range. The total number of recipients in
each program is used to weight the payment schedules of each program.
12 This distinction is not perfect. For some incidents, a criminal com-
mits more than one offense, and these incidents are typically classified
according to the most serious offense in the data according to a hierarchy
established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. For example, if a
criminal robs and then kills his victim, this incident is typically classified
as a homicide. Therefore, some incidents that are classified as other
crimes may have financial motivations. It is noteworthy that the crime
data do not cover the possession and sale of illegal drugs. Evidence pre-
sented in Dobkin and Puller (2007) suggests that this kind of activity most
frequently occurs soon after the distribution of government transfer pay-
ments, when drug users have the resources to increase their consumption.
13 For each city, weather measurements are taken from the airport sta-
tion nearest to the city, and missing data are augmented with data from
other nearby stations.
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these results are not substantially different from the results
presented in tables 4 to 6.14
IV. Results
Figure 2 presents crime rates, averaged over three-day
intervals, for the early payment sample and the staggered
payment sample. Daily crime rates are computed for each
city and type of crime by dividing the count of reported inci-
dents by the sample period average number of reported inci-
dents in the city. Panel A displays rates for all crimes. The
solid line with diamond markers indicates how rates change
over the course of the month in cities in the early payment
sample. In the cities in this sample, the overall crime rate is
above average in the middle of the month, and it falls at the
beginning of the month. It reaches its lowest point, 0.97, at
the start of the month and then increases to about 1.01 over
the next two weeks, implying an increase of about 4%.
Panels B and C, respectively, show crime rates for finan-
cially motivated crimes and other crimes. In cities in the
early payment sample, there is a pronounced monthly cycle
in the rate of financially motivated crimes but no discern-
able trend in other crimes. Financially motivated crime rates
increase from around 0.96 at the beginning of the month to
more than 1.02, indicating an increase of about 6%.
The dashed lines with square markers indicate how crime
rates change over the course of the month for cities in the
staggered payment sample. In this sample, there is no
apparent trend in overall crime, financially motivated crime,
or other crime over the course of the month. These patterns
in figure 2 are consistent with the theory that welfare bene-
ficiaries exhaust their welfare-related income soon after
receiving it and then attempt to augment their income with
income from criminal activity later in the month.
Table 4 presents the results of specifications that analyze
patterns in total reported incidents of Type I or Group A
crimes. The dependent variable studied in the OLS specifi-
cations in columns 1 to 4 is the crime rate, defined as the
number of reported incidents in a city on a particular date
divided by average daily reported incidents in the city. Each
specification in table 4 includes two kinds of fixed effects.
City  Month  Year fixed effects control for differences
across cities even if these vary month to month. For exam-
ple, these fixed effects control for local election cycles that
have been shown by Levitt (1997) to affect the size of
police forces. City  Day of week fixed effects control for
differences in criminal activity across days of the week in
individual cities. Standard errors appear in parentheses, and
they are computed using a block bootstrap technique in
which city-month blocks are used for sampling.
The coefficients on dummy for the first to the tenth of the
month are negative and significant in columns 1 and 2. The
0.0318 coefficient in column 2 implies that the crime rate
is 3.2% below average during the first ten days of the month
in cities where welfare payments are focused at the begin-
ning of the month. The coefficients on the staggered pay-
ment dummy interacted with the dummy for the first to the
tenth of the month are positive and significant and of
slightly smaller magnitude than the coefficients on the
dummy for the first to the tenth. A Wald test reveals that
the sum of the coefficients on the dummy for the first to the
tenth of the month and on the interaction terms for each
specification is not statistically distinguishable from 0,
implying no discernable monthly patterns in reported inci-
dents of crime in cities in the staggered payment sample.
Factors that are operative in both the early payment sample
and the staggered payment sample do not explain increases
in crime in the early payment sample.
The specification in column 2 includes controls for
weather and a dummy that is equal to 1 on holidays and 0
TABLE 3.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Mean Median Standard Deviation
Crime rate—All crimes 1.0000 0.9987 0.1814
Count of reported incidents—All crimes 107.75 96.000 65.975
Crime rate—Financially motivated crimes 1.0000 0.9955 0.2146
Count of reported incidents—Financially motivated crimes 91.633 75.000 60.017
Crime rate—Other crimes 1.0000 0.9465 0.5386
Count of reported incidents—Other crimes 15.673 12.000 12.118
Count of reported incidents—Burglary 16.904 13.000 14.679
Count of reported incidents—Larceny-theft 45.478 42.000 29.708
Count of reported incidents—Motor vehicle theft 20.001 16.000 14.657
Count of reported incidents—Robbery 9.2505 6.0000 9.5026
Dummy for 1st–10th 0.3286 0.0000 0.4697
Time-since-payment index 0.4698 0.4457 0.1788
Average temperature 59.802 62.000 17.930
Precipitation 0.1083 0.0000 0.3418
Snowfall 0.0506 0.0000 0.5040
Holiday dummy 0.0321 0.0000 0.1763
The crime data include reported incidents of all crimes that are classified as Type I crimes in the UCR reporting system and Group A crimes in the NIBRS reporting system. Financially motivated crimes include
reported incidents of crimes in which the perpetrator is likely to have a direct financial motivation, specifically burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. Other crimes include arson, assault offenses,
forcible sex offenses, and homicide. Crime rates for each city on each day are computed by taking incident counts and dividing by the sample period average number of daily reported incidents in the city. Dummy
for 1st–10th is a dummy that is equal to 1 in the first ten days of the month and 0 otherwise. Time-since-payment Index is an index between 0 and 1 that reflects the average number of days that have passed since wel-
fare recipients received their last payment. Average temperature is the average temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipitation and snowfall are measured in inches. The holiday dummy is equal to 1 on U.S. federal
holidays and 0 otherwise.
14 Results are available from the author on request.
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otherwise. Consistent with previous work, crime appears to
increase as temperatures rise and decrease with precipita-
tion and snowfall. Crime rates are also lower on holidays.
The specifications presented in columns 3 and 4 are simi-
lar to those in columns 1 and 2, but they use the time-since-
payment index to identify the effects of the timing of wel-
fare payments and also include a fixed effect for each calen-
dar day of the month. These specifications identify the
effect of the timing of payments off of differences in how
the index changes over the course of the month across
cities. The results indicate that crime rates increase with the
amount of time that has passed since welfare payments
occurred. The 0.1201 coefficient on the time-since-payment
index in column 4 implies that, in the extreme case in which
all welfare payments occurred on the first of the month,
crime rates would be 12.0% higher on the thirty-first of the
month relative to the first of the month. A 1 standard devia-
tion increase in the time-since-payment index is associated
with a 2.2% increase in the overall crime rate.15 Columns 5
to 8 of table 4 contain results of negative binomial specifi-
FIGURE 2.—CRIME RATES OVER THE COURSE OF THE MONTH
Panel A displays rates for all crimes that are classified as Type I crimes in the UCR reporting system and Group A crimes in the NIBRS reporting system. Panel B displays rates for crimes in which the perpetrator
is likely to have a direct financial motivation, specifically burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. Panel C displays rates for other crimes, specifically arson, assault offenses, forcible sex offenses,
and homicide. The data points are calculated by taking average crime rates across three-day periods for cities in which food stamp payments are focused at the beginning of the month (the early payment sample) and
cities in which these payments are more staggered (the staggered payment sample). Crime rates for each city on each day are computed by taking incident counts and dividing by the sample period average number of
daily reported incidents in the city.
15 If increases in criminal activity were focused among welfare benefi-
ciaries and these beneficiaries committed only a fraction of crimes, then
increases in crime among this population would be larger than the aggre-
gate results indicate.
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cations that analyze counts of reported incidents as opposed
to crime rates. The results in the specifications are very
similar to those in columns 1 to 4.
The timing of welfare payments is hypothesized to affect
crimes in which perpetrators have a direct financial motiva-
tion and not necessarily other kinds of crime. The specifica-
tions in table 5 analyze crimes that are likely to have finan-
cial motives. The specifications in this table are the same as
those presented in table 4 except the dependent variables
analyzed are the rate of financially motivated crime in col-
umns 1 to 4 and the count of reported incidents of finan-
cially motivated crime in columns 5 to 8. As in table 4, the
coefficients on the dummy for the first to the tenth of the
month are negative and significant, and the coefficients on
this dummy interacted with the staggered payment dummy
are positive and significant. These results indicate increases
in financially motivated crimes in cities where welfare pay-
ments are focused at the beginning of the month. In cities
where welfare payments are more staggered, increases are
less pronounced and do not differ statistically from the null
of there being no temporal trend. The coefficients on the
time-since-payment index are also positive and significant.
The effects of the timing of welfare payments on finan-
cially motivated crimes appear to be more pronounced than
its effects on total crime. The 0.0377 coefficient on the
dummy for the first to the tenth in column 2 implies that in
the early payment sample, the financially motivated crime
rate is 3.8% (as opposed to 3.2% for all crimes) lower in the
first ten days of the month than it is over the rest of the
month. The 0.1408 coefficient on the time-since-payment
index in column 4 indicates that in the extreme case, all
welfare payments occurred on the first of the month, the
financially motivated crime rate would be 14.1% (as
opposed to 12.0% for all crimes) higher on the thirty-first of
the month relative to the first.
If patterns in crime were attributable to reporting biases
or effects of police deployment that are similar across dif-
ferent types of crime, then the data would indicate an
increase in crimes other than financially motivated crimes
over the course of welfare payment cycles as well. The
hypothesis that patterns in crime reflect income needs that
arise during welfare payment cycles does not make this pre-
diction. Table 6 presents results of specifications that test
for temporal trends in other crimes. The results do not indi-
cate any statistically significant relations between the tim-
ing of welfare payments and other crimes. The coefficients
on the dummy for first through the tenth are positive, and
they are insignificant and of much smaller magnitude than
the coefficients on this variable in the specifications that
explain financially motivated crimes presented in table 5.
The coefficients on the dummy are statistically significantly
lower in specifications explaining financially motivated
crimes than in specifications explaining other crimes. This
implies that in the early payment sample, crime rates for
financially motivated crimes are significantly lower in the
first ten days of the month than crime rates for other crimes.
The coefficients on the time-since-payment index are all
also insignificant, and they are very small in magnitude in
TABLE 4.—THE EFFECTS OF THE TIMING OF WELFARE PAYMENTS ON CRIME
Crime Rate Count of Reported Incidents
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.9976
(0.0153)
0.8703
(0.0233)
0.9005
(0.0303)
0.7732
(0.0421)
5.2373
(0.2168)
5.4441
(0.2427)
5.1876
(0.2400)
5.4294
(0.2850)
Dummy for 1st–10th 0.0292
(0.0061)
0.0318
(0.0055)
0.0226
(0.0054)
0.0254
(0.0048)
Staggered payment dummy* 0.0255 0.0266 0.0143 0.0153
Dummy for 1st–10th (0.0097) (0.0090) (0.0081) (0.0074)
Time-since-payment index 0.1165
(0.0260)
0.1201
(0.0325)
0.0863
(0.0221)
0.0858
(0.0242)
Average temperature 0.0026
(0.0003)
0.0026
(0.0003)
0.0030
(0.0003)
0.0029
(0.0003)
Precipitation 0.0175
(0.0043)
0.0169
(0.0037)
0.0189
(0.0040)
0.0180
(0.0051)
Snowfall 0.0303
(0.0031)
0.0310
(0.0027)
0.0381
(0.0049)
0.0387
(0.0045)
Holiday dummy 0.0977
(0.0107)
0.1014
(0.0115)
0.1148
(0.0100)
0.1165
(0.0085)
City Month  Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City  Day of the week fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of month fixed effects? No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Number of observations 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496
R2 0.1434 0.1794 0.1590 0.1951
Log likelihood 35,413 35,091 35,336 35,018
The crime data include reported incidents of all crimes that are classified as Type I crimes in the UCR reporting system and Group A crimes in the NIBRS reporting system. Crime rates for each city on each day
are computed by taking incident counts and dividing by the sample period average number of daily reported incidents in the city. The specifications presented in columns 1–4 are OLS specifications, and those in col-
umns 5–8 are negative binomial specifications. Each specification includes fixed effects for each city/month/year combination and each city/day of the week pair, and the specifications in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 also
include fixed effects for each day of the month. Dummy for 1st–10th is a dummy that is equal to 1 in the first ten days of the month and 0 otherwise. Staggered payment dummy is equal to 1 for cities where food
stamp payments are not exclusively made during the first ten days of the month. Time-since-payment index is an index between 0 and 1 that reflects the average number of days since welfare recipients received their
last payment. Average temperature is measured in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipitation and snowfall are measured in inches. The holiday dummy is equal to 1 on U.S. federal holidays and 0 otherwise. Standard errors
appear in parentheses, and they are computed using a block bootstrap techinque in which city-month blocks are used for sampling.
106 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
columns 7 and 8. These results suggest that explanations for
patterns in crime over monthly welfare payment cycles that
do not differentiate between financially motivated and other
crimes are incomplete.
Table 7 displays an analysis of financially motivated
crimes by type of crime. The specifications are the same as
those presented in columns 7 and 8 of table 5, but the
dependent variable is the count of reported burglaries in
TABLE 6.—THE EFFECTS OF THE TIMING OF WELFARE PAYMENTS ON CRIME—OTHER CRIMES
Crime Rate Count of Reported Incidents
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.9249
(0.0366)
0.4702
(0.0412)
0.9389
(0.0804)
0.4254
(0.0870)
4.5437
(2.8284)
4.5530
(0.4375)
4.6775
(0.3521)
4.6483
(0.3862)
Dummy for 1st–10th 0.0065
(0.0197)
0.0027
(0.0190)
0.0070
(0.0099)
0.0058
(0.0088)
Staggered payment dummy* 0.0030 0.0047 0.0112 0.0111
Dummy for 1st–10th (0.0261) (0.0216) (0.0173) (0.0147)
Time-since-payment index 0.0787
(0.0743)
0.0905
(0.0751)
0.0015
(0.0489)
0.0062
(0.0517)
Average temperature 0.0080
(0.0005)
0.0079
(0.0009)
0.0071
(0.0006)
0.0070
(0.0006)
Precipitation 0.0833
(0.0138)
0.0824
(0.0131)
0.0748
(0.0108)
0.0739
(0.0090)
Snowfall 0.0199
(0.0092)
0.0200
(0.0102)
0.0229
(0.0079)
0.0233
(0.0083)
Holiday dummy 0.1574
(0.0270)
0.1493
(0.0326)
0.1297
(0.0222)
0.1238
(0.0201)
City Month  Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City  Day of the week fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of month fixed effects? No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Number. of observations 8,947 8,947 8,947 8,947 8,947 8,947 8,947 8,947
R2 0.0680 0.0932 0.0728 0.0963
Log likelihood 23,051 22,872 23,022 22,853
The crime data include reported incidents of arson, assault offenses, forcible sex offenses, and homicide. Crime rates for each city on each day are computed by taking incident counts and dividing by the sample
period average number of daily reported incidents in the city. The specifications presented in columns 1–4 are OLS specifications, and those in columns 5–8 are negative binomial specifications. Each specification
includes fixed effects for each city/month/year combination and each city/day of the week pair, and the specifications in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 also include fixed effects for each day of the month. Dummy for 1st–
10th is a dummy that is equal to 1 in the first ten days of the month and 0 otherwise. Staggered payment dummy is equal to 1 for cities where food stamp payments are not exclusively made during the first ten days of
the month. Time-since-payment index is an index between 0 and 1 that reflects the average number of days that have passed since welfare recipients received their last payment. Average temperature is the average
temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipitation and snowfall are measured in inches. The holiday dummy is equal to 1 on U.S. federal holidays and 0 otherwise. Standard errors appear in parentheses, and they are
computed using a block bootstrap techinque in which city-month blocks are used for sampling.
TABLE 5.—THE EFFECTS OF THE TIMING OF WELFARE PAYMENTS ON CRIME—FINANCIALLY MOTIVATED CRIMES
Crime Rate Count of Reported Incidents
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 1.0045
(0.0214)
0.9253
(0.0276)
0.8785
(0.0309)
0.7991
(0.0417)
4.8847
(0.2732)
5.1146
(0.2306)
4.8154
(0.2232)
5.0771
(0.1913)
Dummy for 1st–10th 0.0353
(0.0062)
0.0377
(0.0068)
0.0289
(0.0050)
0.0316
(0.0054)
Staggered payment dummy* 0.0313 0.0324 0.0214 0.0224
Dummy for 1st–10th (0.0100) (0.0089) (0.0075) (0.0093)
Time-since-payment index 0.1379
(0.0311)
0.1408
(0.0291)
0.1107
(0.0256)
0.1103
(0.0232)
Average temperature 0.0019
(0.0004)
0.0019
(0.0004)
0.0022
(0.0003)
0.0022
(0.0003)
Precipitation 0.0082
(0.0058)
0.0075
(0.0058)
0.0106
(0.0044)
0.0096
(0.0053)
Snowfall 0.0321
(0.0027)
0.0329
(0.0031)
0.0400
(0.0043)
0.0406
(0.0042)
Holiday dummy 0.1373
(0.0121)
0.1411
(0.0111)
0.1550
(0.0121)
0.1564
(0.0120)
City Month  Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City  Day of the week fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of month fixed effects? No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Number of observations 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496
R2 0.1823 0.2148 0.1958 0.2284
Log likelihood 34,581 34,280 34,509 34,211
The crime data include reported incidents of crimes in which the perpetrator is likely to have a direct financial motivation, specifically burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. Crime rates for each
city on each day are computed by taking incident counts and dividing by the sample period average number of daily reported incidents in the city. The specifications presented in columns 1–4 are OLS specifications,
and those in columns 5–8 are negative binomial specifications. Each specification includes fixed effects for each city/month/year combination and each city/day of the week pair, and the specifications in columns 3,
4, 7, and 8 also include fixed effects for each day of the month. Dummy for 1st–10th is a dummy that is equal to 1 in the first ten days of the month and 0 otherwise. Staggered payment dummy is equal to 1 for cities
where food stamp payments are not exclusively made during the first ten days of the month. Time-since-payment index is an index between 0 and 1 that reflects the average number of days since welfare recipients
received their last payment. Average temperature is the average temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipitation and snowfall are measured in inches. The holiday dummy is equal to 1 on U.S. federal holidays and 0
otherwise. Standard errors appear in parentheses, and they are computed using a block bootstrap techinque in which city-month blocks are used for sampling.
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columns 1 and 2, larceny-thefts in columns 3 and 4, motor
vehicle thefts in columns 5 and 6, and robberies in columns
7 and 8. The time-since-payment index attracts a positive
coefficient in each specification. These coefficients are
insignificant in the burglary specification that includes con-
trols. This could reflect the fact that burglars often study
potential targets before deciding to enter them and typically
attempt to commit their crimes when properties are unoccu-
pied.16 Therefore, this type of crime may be less motivated
by short-run liquidity needs than other kinds of financially
motivated crimes.
The coefficients on the time-since-payment index in the
specifications explaining patterns in larceny-theft are simi-
lar in magnitude to those estimated in the specifications
explaining patterns in burglary, but they are more precisely
estimated. These coefficients, and those on the index in
the specifications that analyze the incidence of motor vehi-
cle theft and robbery, are all statistically significant. The
implied effect of the timing of welfare payments is particu-
larly pronounced for robbery. The 0.2512 coefficient on the
time-since-payment index in column 8 implies that robbery
rates are 25.1% higher on the thirty-first of the month rela-
tive to the first of the month in the extreme case of a juris-
diction where all welfare payments occurred on the first of
the month. Individuals who have exhausted their welfare-
related income need liquid assets, and robbery is more
likely to yield cash than burglary, larceny-theft, and motor
vehicle theft, each of which typically involves stealing
other types of property.
The specifications presented in tables 4 to 7 test for a
linear relation between crime rates and the time-since-
payment index. However, the patterns in figure 2 suggest
that the increase in criminal activity in the early payment
sample primarily occurs early in the month and that crim-
inal activity recedes at the end of the month. Less para-
metric tests that include indicators set equal to 1 for 0.1
increments of the time-since-payment-index shed additional
light on the exact timing of the estimated effects. Table 8
presents the results of tests that are similar to those pre-
sented in columns 7 and 8 of tables 5 and 6, replacing the
index with indicators. The indicator for values of the time-
since-payment index between 0 and 0.1 is omitted from the
specifications, so the other indicators measure the incidence
of crime relative to periods that have these low index values.
The specifications in the first two columns explain the
count of financially motivated crimes. In column 2, the co-
efficient on the indicator for values of the time-since-payment
index that are larger than 0.1 and less than or equal to 0.2 is
equal to 0.0716 and is statistically significant, suggesting an
increase in the crime rate soon after payments occur. The
coefficients on the indicators increase as the index
increases, reaching a value of 0.1254 for index values
between 0.7 and 0.8. F-tests reveal that this coefficient is
statistically different from each of the coefficients on the
indicators for values of the index less than or equal to 0.5.
Therefore, financially motivated crime is increasing for a
fairly large range of index values, suggesting that the raw
patterns in figure 2 are a bit misleading.
The results in columns 1 and 2 also indicate that finan-
cially motivated crime recedes for very high values of the
time-since-payment index. In column 2, the coefficient on
the indicator for values of the index that are greater than 0.9
TABLE 7.—THE EFFECTS OF THE TIMING OF WELFARE PAYMENTS BY TYPE OF FINANCIALLY MOTIVATED CRIME
Dependent Variable Count of Reported Incidents
Type of Crime Burglary Larceny-Theft Motor Vehicle Theft Robbery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 3.6781
(0.3607)
3.6426
(0.4205)
4.3150
(0.2959)
4.4937
(0.1998)
4.0290
(0.3103)
4.0644
(0.2821)
3.4936
(0.2704)
3.4055
(0.3200)
Time-since-payment index 0.0865
(0.0401)
0.0910
(0.0504)
0.0926
(0.0285)
0.0913
(0.0305)
0.1354
(0.0490)
0.1363
(0.0473)
0.2484
(0.0750)
0.2512
(0.0662)
Average temperature 0.0033
(0.0005)
0.0023
(0.0004)
0.0007
(0.0005)
0.0029
(0.0006)
Precipitation 0.0184
(0.0084)
0.0293
(0.0078)
0.0110
(0.0096)
0.0122
(0.0116)
Snowfall 0.0439
(0.0085)
0.0470
(0.0060)
0.0244
(0.0050)
0.0360
(0.0093)
Holiday dummy 0.1415
(0.0163)
0.2080
(0.0122)
0.0725
(0.0232)
0.1304
(0.0223)
City Month  Year fixed effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
City  Day of the week fixed effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Day of month fixed effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496 9,496
Log likelihood 24,933 24,849 30,621 30,367 26,469 26,448 20,856 20,816
The specifications are negative binomial specifications, and each specification includes fixed effects for each city/month/year combination, each city/day of the week pair, and each day of the month. Time-since-
payment index is an index between 0 and 1 that reflects the average number of days since welfare recipients received their last payment. Average temperature is the average temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipi-
tation and snowfall are measured in inches. The holiday dummy is equal to 1 on U.S. federal holidays and 0 otherwise. Standard errors appear in parentheses, and they are computed using a block bootstrap technique
in which city-month blocks are used for sampling.
16 Weisel (2002) and Clarke (2002) provide descriptive information
about burglary.
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and less than or equal to 1 is 0.0733, and on F-test reveals
that this coefficient is smaller than the 0.1254 coefficient
for index values between 0.7 and 0.8.17 A few factors might
explain this pattern. First, some programs in some jurisdic-
tions make payments to recipients before the scheduled
payment dates if the scheduled payment dates fall on week-
ends or holidays. As a consequence, days that I have classi-
fied as being at the end of monthly payment cycles could be
days when payments occur. Second, it is possible that wel-
fare beneficiaries may be able to delay consumption at the
end of the month and hold out until payments arrive. By
doing so, they avoid the costs and potential punishment of
committing crime. Third, estimates of the coefficient on
the dummy that is equal to 1 for values of the time-since-
payment index that lie between 0.9 and 1.0 are estimated
from only 71 data points, and they have a high standard
error. Therefore, the declines observed at the very end of
the month are imprecisely estimated.
The tests presented in columns 3 and 4 of table 8 explain
the count of reported incidents of other crimes. None of the
indicators attracts a significant coefficient, and these coeffi-
cients do not tend to increase as the value of the index
increases. As seen in the analysis described earlier, the inci-
dence of other crimes does not seem to increase with the
amount of time that has passed since welfare payments
occurred.
Taken together, the results are consistent with the idea
that individuals who receive support from welfare payments
consume welfare-related income quickly and then attempt
to supplement it with income from criminal activity. Unfor-
tunately, it is not possible to bolster this evidence with ana-
lysis of the sources of income of the perpetrators of crimes
because of data constraints. According to national data,
only approximately 15% of Part I UCR crimes result in an
arrest, and detailed income data are not even collected for
arrested individuals.18
TABLE 8.—NONPARAMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS
Dependent Variable Count of Reported Incidents
Type of Crime Financially Motivated Crimes Other Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 4.7912
(0.2138)
5.0510
(0.1877)
4.6498
(0.2450)
4.6113
(0.3971)
Time-since-payment index >.1 and .2 0.0710
(0.0239)
0.0716
(0.0244)
0.0402
(0.0511)
0.0407
(0.0455)
Time-since-payment index >.2 and .3 0.0867
(0.0232)
0.0863
(0.0229)
0.0395
(0.0483)
0.0455
(0.0415)
Time-since-payment index >.3 and .4 0.0951
(0.0242)
0.0958
(0.0222)
0.0282
(0.0435)
0.0335
(0.0381)
Time-since-payment index >.4 and .5 0.0968
(0.0237)
0.0983
(0.0231)
0.0350
(0.0446)
0.0425
(0.0401)
Time-since-payment index >.5 and .6 0.1078
(0.0234)
0.1090
(0.0243)
0.0276
(0.0447)
0.0364
(0.0376)
Time-since-payment index >.6 and .7 0.1259
(0.0242)
0.1239
(0.0267)
0.0340
(0.0486)
0.0377
(0.0415)
Time-since-payment index >.7 and .8 0.1276
(0.0265)
0.1254
(0.0282)
0.0466
(0.0506)
0.0476
(0.0419)
Time-since-payment index >.8 and .9 0.1181
(0.0281)
0.1167
(0.0346)
0.0182
(0.0562)
0.0250
(0.0452)
Time-since-payment index >.9 and 1 0.0723
(0.0428)
0.0733
(0.0396)
0.0257
(0.0808)
0.0038
(0.0522)
Average temperature 0.0022
(0.0003)
0.0070
(0.0006)
Precipitation 0.0096
(0.0051)
0.0740
(0.0086)
Snowfall 0.0405
(0.0052)
0.0232
(0.0082)
Holiday dummy 0.1561
(0.0127)
0.1240
(0.0232)
City Month  Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
City  Day of the week fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of month fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 9,496 9,496 8,947 8,947
Log likelihood 34,499 34,203 23,019 22,850
The specifications are negative binomial specifications. Each specification includes fixed effects for each city/month/year combination, each city/day of the week pair, and each day of the month. Time-since-
payment index is an index between 0 and 1 that reflects the average number of days that have passed since welfare recipients received their last payment. The specifications include indicators that are equal to 1 for
each 0.1 increment of this index and otherwise equal 0, omitting the indicator for values of the index less than or equal to 0.1. Average temperature is the average temperature in degrees Fahrenheit. Precipitation and
snowfall are measured in inches. The holiday dummy is equal to 1 on U.S. federal holidays and 0 otherwise. Standard errors appear in parentheses, and they are computed using a block bootstrap technique in which
city-month blocks are used for sampling.
17 The 0.0733 coefficient does not differ from the coefficients on any of
the other index indicators by a statistically significant margin.
18 See Crime in the United States, published by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
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Although detailed income data for perpetrators are not
available, it is possible to compare the demographics of
arrested individuals with those who receive support from
welfare payments, and some considerations suggest it is
plausible that they are behind temporal patterns in finan-
cially motivated crime. First, the number of individuals
directly receiving welfare payments in a month is much
higher than the number of crimes committed in a month. In
the cities in my sample, there are approximately fifty food
stamp recipients for each financially motivated crime in the
average month.19 Put differently, if all financially motivated
crimes were committed by recipients of some form of wel-
fare payment, 2% or less of welfare recipients, depending
on the overlap of recipients across welfare programs, would
commit such crimes in a typical month. This level of crim-
inal activity does not seem implausibly large. Furthermore,
unreported results indicate that the timing of welfare pay-
ments appears to have more pronounced effects in jurisdic-
tions where a larger share of the population receives food
stamp payments.20 Specifications like those presented in
tables 4 to 6 that include not only the time-since-payment
index, but also this index interacted with the share of the
population receiving food stamps shown in table 1 yields
insignificant coefficients on the index itself and positive
and significant coefficients on the interaction terms when
the dependent variable measures the incidence of all crime
or financially motivated crime. These results imply that the
time that has passed since welfare payments occurred mat-
ters more in cities with larger welfare populations.21
The results also seem plausible given that the income
profile of criminals is similar to that of welfare recipients.
Harlow (1998, 2000) presents the results of surveys of jail
inmates and finds that individuals who are in jail for com-
mitting financially motivated crimes report very low pre-
arrest levels of monthly income and that more than 75% of
them qualify for and receive public counsel.
However, there are notable gender and age differences
between criminals and direct welfare recipients. During the
sample period at the national level, 59% of food stamp reci-
pients, 57% of SSI recipients, and 60% of TANF recipients
were female, but only 30% of individuals arrested for finan-
cially motivated crimes were female. Furthermore, a large
fraction of the males who received TANF benefits were
young children. However, Hays (2003), Venkatesh (2006),
and others point out that a large fraction of females who
receive welfare payments live with and pool their resources
with men, often without reporting these relationships to
welfare providers. These studies also point out that welfare
recipients are economically embedded in their local com-
munities. Therefore, payments to women are also likely to
generate cycles in resources for other low-income indivi-
duals who benefit from welfare indirectly.
Additional tests indicate that the results are robust to sev-
eral concerns.22 As mentioned in section II, the distinction
between the early payment sample and the staggered pay-
ment sample is imperfect. This distinction is based on the
timing of food stamp payments. In order to confirm that
results of tests that use the dummy for the first through the
tenth of the month are robust to using a more strictly
defined sample, I drop Detroit, Philadelphia, Providence,
and Milwaukee from the sample. These are cities in which
either food stamp payments are focused at the beginning of
the month but TANF payments are more staggered or food
stamp payments are staggered but TANF payments are
focused at the beginning of the month. The results are not
materially different from those presented in the tables.
Two other robustness checks are worth noting. First,
measurement error or reporting biases could give rise to an
excessive number of reported incidents on the first or last
day of the month. For example, if there is a delay between
when a crime occurs and when it is discovered or reported,
there may be an incentive to report the crime on the first or
last day of the month, so it is included in crime statistics for
that month. The results are little changed by dropping
observations from the first and last day of each month. The
results are also robust to dropping New Orleans from the
sample. The New Orleans data cover only 2006, and con-
flating factors related to the aftermath of hurricane Katrina
could affect patterns of crime.
V. Conclusion
Analysis of patterns in crime in twelve large U.S. cities
where more than 10% of the population receives food
stamps shows that criminal activity is increasing in the
amount of time that has passed since welfare payments
occurred. The increase reflects an increase in crimes in
which the perpetrator is likely to have a financial motiva-
tion and not other types of Part I UCR or Group A NIBRS
offenses. Temporal patterns in crime are not observed in
jurisdictions where welfare payments are relatively more
staggered. These results indicate that individuals who
receive support from welfare payments consume welfare-
related income quickly and then attempt to supplement it
with income from criminal activity.
The findings point out a role for behavioral considera-
tions in economic explanations of crime. Existing research
shows that welfare recipients exhibit short-run impatience
and do not smooth their consumption of welfare income.
This type of consumption behavior is associated with
19 This figure is computed by dividing the number of food stamp recipi-
ents in a typical month as measured in table 1, summed across the sample
cities, by the monthly average aggregate number of financially motivated
crimes in all the sample cities.
20 These results are available from the author on request.
21 It is important to be cautious in interpreting this result because the
sample does not include cities in which a small share of the population
receives welfare payments. If a larger share of the crimes in such jurisdic-
tions were committed by welfare beneficiaries, temporal patterns in crime
could still reflect welfare payment schedules. 22 The results of these robustness tests appear in Foley (2008).
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increased criminal activity later in monthly welfare pay-
ment cycles.
The results also carry implications for the design of wel-
fare programs. Increasing the frequency of welfare payments
would smooth patterns in crime. The leveling of criminal
activity would make communities safer because police
departments would not become overwhelmed by cyclical
spikes. Under certain assumptions, frequent payments could
also lower crime rates. If welfare beneficiaries follow a
quasi-hyperbolic model of intertemporal choice, frequent
payments would make them better off by forcing them to
smooth their consumption. Such payments would reduce the
extent to which they face dire circumstances because they
consumed welfare-related income too quickly. As a result,
circumstances that would be likely to induce criminal activ-
ity would be less common. Nearly all jurisdictions now dis-
tribute food stamp and TANF payments on electronic benefit
transfer debit cards, so the costs of more frequent payments
would be likely to be low. Shapiro (2005), Wilde and Ran-
ney (2000), and Ohls et al. (1992) also point out benefits of
more frequent payments. Such changes would require legis-
lative action because the law currently requires that food
stamp and SSI payments be made in monthly allotments.
Finally, the findings have implications for the deploy-
ment of police officers and the labor laws applicable to law
enforcement. In jurisdictions where welfare payments are
focused at the beginning of the month, increased levels of
criminal activity at the end of the month call for increased
police protection during this time. However, 1986 amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act require that law
enforcement officers be compensated with overtime pay for
working more than forty hours a week. As a consequence, it
is costly for departments to shift resources to times when
they are particularly needed. More flexible labor laws could
help police departments alter deployment schedules to pre-
vent and combat crime.
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